



## Case 4 Kenya Defining CCCM roles and responsibilities in emergency operations

### Keywords

- Capacity building
- Durable solutions
- National humanitarian actors
- National Institutions
- Partnership



### Displacement Data

**Country:** Kenya

**Cause of displacement:** Conflict

**Conflict date:** 2007-2008

**People displaced:** 600,000 at peak displacement (February 2008)

### Case Study Focus

**Project location:** Rift Valley, Western, and North Eastern Provinces

**Project Date:** 2007-2008



*IDP Camp in the Nakuru Rift Valley. The camp hosted 14,500 IDPs of Kikuyu ethnicity after the post-election violence. May 2008 / H. Caux / UNHCR*

### Context

Prior to 2007, Kenya had a long history of internal displacement, most of which had been associated with its colonial legacy, land ownership, and inter-clan conflict over water resources. Large-scale conflict-induced displacement occurred in the aftermath of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992-2007. In 2007 two-thirds of Kenyans (400,000 out of 600,000) who were forced to flee their homes had previously been displaced due to conflict, droughts, floods and other natural disasters.

The December 2007 post-election violence was prompted by claims that the elections were fraudulent. In January 2008 violence erupted spontaneously in the cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, but was more pronounced in the opposition strongholds of the Rift Valley, and the Nyanza, Western, and Coast Provinces. Some 300 camps were set up in the country, with the majority located on the Naivasha-Eldoret axis, where the violence was most severe. The populations that were most affected by this violence were city dwellers, farmers with rights to their own land, farmers who rented their land, agricultural workers, squatters, and persons who owned small businesses.

The scale and the scope of displacement quickly led to the setting up, consolidation and expansion of temporary settlements into large camps. The majority of the camps were closed within seven months, as most of the IDPs either returned home, settled close to their homes in “satellite camps”, or “integrated” (living in their own accommodation or with host families). Only three defined IDP camps (Naivasha town, Nakuru and Eldoret show grounds) were still up and running in July 2008, with 20,000 camp residents in total.

## Cluster Activation

The CCCM Cluster was activated as a standalone cluster in January 2008 along with 11 other clusters. The cluster approach was activated because the country was overwhelmed by the crisis, despite the presence of a strong governance structure. The majority of the 11 clusters were phased out in August 2008 with the exception of Protection and Early Recovery.

The Kenyan Red Cross Society (KRCS) was designated by the Government of Kenya (GoK) to head the emergency response for the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), Shelter and NFI Clusters. The KRCS was referred to as the defacto “must go through partner,” in terms of camp management.

The roles of the CCCM Cluster were to provide support to KRCS in terms of camp infrastructure, registration and service provision. However, at the onset of the crisis the roles and responsibilities of all CCCM actors were not well established. Thus, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted, agreed, and signed by the KRCS and the CCCM Cluster. The CCCM Cluster played an integral role, providing advice and technical support to the KRCS.



IDP return to Nasienda, North Rift Valley. May 2008 / H. Caux / UNHCR

## Actions Taken

- **MoU signed:** This document established clear roles and responsibilities of the cluster lead agency and the camp management agency. It facilitated coordination and collaboration in the emergency response.
- **Capacity building trainings** for local staff and the government on CCCM issues.
- **Operational support:** The cluster lead agency funded 19 camp managers.

## Challenges

- **Cluster lead staff had prior experience in refugee, not IDP contexts.**
- **Limited understanding of the cluster system by the national authorities**

**and partners.** The CCCM Cluster’s role was not clearly defined or understood among key national stakeholders.

▪ **Coordination among the cluster and the KRCS.** Without an established MoU indicating who was doing what, where, and when, there was no clear assignment of tasks for the cluster and the KRCS.

▪ **Disconnect between field and national level clusters.** Coordination difficulties between the two cluster levels resulted in gaps in specific emergency operations; particularly in terms of gender-based violence, identification, tracing and family reunification, and special care for vulnerable populations.



Displaced people in Harumi Police Station await assistance. The Kenyan Red Cross, UNHCR, and local church organizations deliver a combination of food and non-food items. January 2008 / B. Bannon / UNHCR

▪ **Issues with IDP return plan “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” or “Operation Return Home”.** The operations promised IDPs \$127 if they agreed to return home. However, the operation was carried out rather hurriedly, and did not establish feedback mechanisms to establish the needs and interests of IDPs being asked to leave the camp. More effective communication with the IDPs regarding issues of security and the availability of basic services in their places of origin would have increased the willingness of IDPs to leave the camp and return home.

▪ **Return was pursued as the only feasible durable solution.** The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were not referenced prior to the return operation.

▪ **Limited contingency planning** to address the scope and scale of displacement.

▪ **Registration handover from KRCS to the national authorities was problematic.** At the beginning of the crisis it was the KRCS’ responsibility to conduct IDP registration. However, when Operation Return Home was implemented, no actor assumed this role. There was insufficient data on IDPs in formal camps, transit sites, and places of return. In addition, no agency was assigned to conduct formal profiling exercises.



IDP Children staying in a settlement with their families in the Murchorve village, Rift Valley. May 2008 / H. Caux / UNHCR

## Successes

▪ **The CCCM Cluster established a good working relationship with its national counterpart (KRCS)** after an MoU was signed. There was more clarity regarding roles and responsibilities between the two actors.

▪ **The CCCM Cluster played a key role in supporting national counterparts** by providing technical assistance and direct support to national counterparts. The cluster took an advisory role rather than an implementing role. The support and advice provided by the cluster was indispensable and instrumental for CCCM activities.

▪ **The cluster lead agency adapted to working in an IDP crisis.**

▪ **The camp conditions improved,** and the majority of the camps complied with the SPHERE standards. There were no outbreaks of diseases or epidemics, which demonstrated effective coordination and management in reaching these standards across camps. This was largely due to the work and response capacity of technical sectors such as WASH and Health, in addition to the government and the KRCS.

## Lessons

- **The importance of defining clear roles and responsibilities.** The MoU opened many doors for the working relationship between the cluster and the KRCS. Investing in a workshop with all relevant partners to discuss the nature, scope, and extent of the cluster lead’s role in IDP operations can lay the groundwork for establishing a MoU.
- **Utilize national capacity to manage camps and have the CCCM Cluster lead play an advisory/technical role.**
- **Engage with national authorities** and discuss the resources and support available.
- **Cluster staff without experience in the Cluster Approach should be trained and prepared.** Training is necessary to ensure that there is complementarity among all actors in IDP emergencies.

• **The CCCM Cluster should work proactively with national authorities to discuss camp closure** at the beginning of the operation in order to avoid confusion over who bears the ultimate responsibility. This will help to ensure that durable solutions will be established in an informed, voluntary, and organized fashion.

• **The IASC-issued guidelines for contingency planning** should be used, especially in countries likely to experience political turmoil during general elections.

• **Registration is a complex service which becomes increasingly challenging in fluid displacement situations.** There are protection risks which need to be carefully assessed prior to IDP registration, especially in post-election violence contexts.



The overall goal of the CCCM Cluster is to improve living conditions of displaced persons. It does this by facilitating the effective provision of protection and services in camps and camp-like settings, advocating for durable solutions and ensuring organized closure and phase-out of camps.